

## MORALITY AND PRACTICE

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### ABSTRACT

*According to the argument presented in this article, in order to fulfil a normative demand on responsible moral research and speech, sometimes known as the need for "consistency," or systematic coherence, one must take moral principles into consideration. The practice of applying ethics involves taking into consideration concerns of right and wrong in the context of particular circumstances. Applied ethics spans a broad variety of subfields, such as bioethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, and legal ethics, among others. In this article, the phrase is used in a more generic sense to refer to any endeavour that is made to determine what is morally acceptable, objectionable, or needed in certain circumstances. However, it does include them as components of moral practice. These circumstances often include problems that are normal and prevalent in daily life and do not apply to a particular area of study, such as medical ethics. As a consequence of this, the essay suggests that a competent theory of morality ought to articulate and defend several moral principles. The major emphasis is on making an effort to offer moral explanations for the assessments of act tokens.*

**Keywords:** - morality, ethics, Practice, value, Wittgenstein.

### INTRODUCTION

In his infrequent utterances and observations on morality and ethics, Wittgenstein demonstrates a conflict between what seems to be relativism and absoluteness. Wittgenstein does address moral issues in a way that is more contextualised in other places, despite the fact that it is true that ethics is meant to be concerned with the ultimate good. It would seem that pressure is being experienced not just by the individual but also by society as a whole. Initially, this gives rise to an issue of exegetical significance: Regarding this matter, did Wittgenstein really experience conflict, and is the tension that he felt genuine? Can his many statements be interpreted in a way that allows them to be interpreted in a way that makes them fit together, and is the tension genuine or is it just superficial? A systemic concern is similar to the exegetical one: it seems that ethics need absoluteness in order to differentiate itself from relativism, which would make it useless. Sensitivity to context, on the other hand, is an essential component of both our own and other people's evaluations. Is it possible for us to find a compromise that allows these two to coexist?

Another "phenotypical" component that is connected to this concept is the notion that the majority of individuals need formal education in order to fulfil their full potential as moral and ethical beings. This is in contrast to the reality that the majority of people are born with these characteristics. The family and neighbours into whom a baby is born become the primary sources of instruction for the infant. From fundamental behavioural training that is based on punishment and reward to learning from the examples

set by renowned individuals or following a planned set of rules, there is a vast variety of potential training techniques and degrees of intensity that may be used. There is a possibility that the size of the community that is relevant might change depending on whether it is a family, tribe, state, or religion. As a result of this stance, contextualism and absolutism are seen in a different light. Although there are many other ways to approach the situation and consequences that might occur, everyone has the ability to get moral training from any source.<sup>1</sup> From both an exegetical and a systematic point of view, the purpose of this paper is to provide light on the link that exists between these two characteristics: absoluteness and context. First, a word about the language before we go on. In this context, the word "ethics" refers to an absolute normativity, which is often expressed in terms of generic principles and unchanging values. On the other hand, the term "morality" refers to a normativity that is founded on particular actions and choices and takes them into consideration within the context of the situation. It is important to note that the terminology is not standard; nonetheless, it is simply terminology, right?

## **OBJECTIVE**

1. To research morality and behavior.
2. To learn how to use ethics while making decisions.

## **Moral Education**

There is a system in place that is known as moral education, and its purpose is to teach and foster the required knowledge, attitudes, values, and talents in youngsters. Therefore, it is concerned with the development of the intellectual, interpersonal, and emotional capabilities that are necessary for moral thinking, behavior, and feeling. Moral education is thus concerned with the activities that socialising agents engage in to assist young people in the development of the abilities that they will need in order to cope with concerns of good and evil in their day-to-day existence. Therefore, the purpose of moral education in the classroom is to implant in students a feeling of connection to fundamental values such as respect and responsibility, while simultaneously giving them the ability to make choices on their own. Regardless of whether a child accepts or rejects a code, it is essential for him to be aware of what he is accepting or rejecting. This is the reason why parents and instructors should be absolutely clear and unambiguous when presenting the child with their own moral principles.

## **Practice**

The word "practice" refers to activities that are performed on a regular basis. Doing is what is involved in practice, as opposed to theory. The definition of practice that is provided by the Cambridge English Dictionary is as follows: "the act of doing something regularly or repeatedly in order to improve your skill at doing it."

## **Wittgenstein on ethics and morality**

When expressing value, Wittgenstein often expresses himself using absolute language. It is not discriminatory, it is universal, and it provides equal service to all those whom it serves. Following are some examples that may be found in his earlier works:<sup>2</sup> Existence outside the sphere of what really takes place and is true is necessary for the existence of anything of value. Due to the fact that everything that

takes place is really a coincidence. The fact that it is not accidental eliminates the idea that its non-accidentality is due to causes that are external to the situation. There is no way that it could be anywhere on our globe. In the year 1960, Wittgenstein published "Tractatus 6.41)." If the pursuit of defining the ultimate good, the ultimate value, and the purpose of life is the source of ethics, then there is no way that ethics can be a scientific discipline. The information included inside it does not add anything new to our existing knowledge. On the other hand, it is a record of a human mental tendency that I cannot help but appreciate a great deal and that I will never, ever belittle. An excerpt from Wittgenstein's "A Lecture on Ethics" (1969a)

In addition, we discover that Wittgenstein uses a similar tone when describing religious belief in his later writings, which we interpret as having significant linkages to ethics: [...] he has what one may define as an unshakeable conviction. The manifestation of this conviction does not occur via the use of reasoning or appeals to ordinary grounds for believing; rather, it is manifested through the control of every area of his life. This is what Wittgenstein wrote in his essay "Lectures on Religious Belief, I," which was published in 1978. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, was acutely aware of the role of context in the whole process of arriving at the appropriate option. What little is known about these things comes mostly from Wittgenstein's conversations with his friends and students, which makes this evidence more circumstantial. An illustration that may be obtained from Rush Rhees's recollections of his conversations with Ludwig Wittgenstein in 1942 is as follows: When I (Rhees) brought up the question of whether or not Brutus' stabbing of Caesar was virtuous (according to Plutarch) or extremely evil (according to Dante), Wittgenstein did not even consider it a topic that he could discuss. What was going through his mind when he made the decision to kill Caesar is completely beyond your comprehension. How could you possibly have justified the killing of his friend? What must have been going through his mind?

One of the points that Rhees is attempting to make in his paper is that, in a normal situation, Wittgenstein would consider factors like intention to be meaningless from an ethical point of view. He does, however, acknowledge their relevance with regard to the moral evaluation that is pertinent here. The next statement indicates that this does not mean that Wittgenstein is against the concept of absolute ethics, which is an interesting proposition to consider. For instance, if he adheres to Christian beliefs, he is able to unequivocally declare that he is obligated to remain true to her regardless of the circumstances. Nevertheless, his problem is a separate one. Included in this are topics such as how to adjust to the new normal, how he can continue to be a good husband despite the significant changes, and other similarly related topics. When it comes to this circumstance, there is no problem with posing the question, "Should I leave her or not?"

It would seem that this is the stance that argues that Christian ethics are absolute, which means that context is irrelevant: Regardless of the circumstances, the need to stay true to one's spouse will always be there. However, it is important to keep in mind that the ethical issue of "What does it mean to be a decent husband?" continues to remain unanswered. The situation is described in a straightforward and concise manner here: "in these significantly changed circumstances." It would seem that the absolute nature of the ethical framework does not prevent one from considering moral conundrums that are heavily influenced by context and for which there are no definitive and unambiguous solutions.<sup>3)</sup> Therefore, it is necessary for us to devise a method that would allow us to include both absolute ethics and contextual morality into a standard framework.

## Wittgenstein on the priority of ethics

Wittgenstein is of the view that ethics seems to be in the driver's seat when it comes to our search for a theory that adequately accounts for morality for the same reason. In the absence of any other living being than myself, is it possible for there to be ethics? Wittgenstein makes this assertion in contrast to the typical focus of morality, which is on other people. He emphasises the importance of this point. In essence, there is no possibility of their being any basic principles of ethics. Even if I am right, it will not be sufficient to meet the ethical norms that are prevalent across the globe. Therefore, the world is neutral due to the fact that it only exists. mostly due to the fact that it is irrelevant whether or not there is life in the cosmos; what is important is rather that there be ethics. Although it is evident that a cosmos devoid of matter is neither good nor evil, it is impossible for a planet that is teeming with life to be either good or wicked on its own. It is only via the problem that both good and evil may make their entrance. In addition, the subject is not a component of the world; rather, it is a boundary of the world. This creates the idea that the individual is the only thing that counts in terms of ethics, and that other aspects, such as the family and the community, play no part at all. Nevertheless, not even this one individual is taken into consideration, despite the fact that they are a contingent human subject. Because there is nothing contingent or material that can ever come close to touching the absoluteness of ethics, regardless of whether it is human or not. It is the transcendental subject that Wittgenstein is referring to, as opposed to the ordinary contingent concept of the human subject. Due to the fact that ethics places such great emphasis on absoluteness, it would seem that any concerns of morality are beyond the framework of ethics. It would seem that this is supported by more passages, such as this one from Wittgenstein's conversations with Waismann: "Schlick says that there are two conceptions of the essence of the good in theological ethics: according to the more superficial view, the good is good because God wills it; according to the more profound view, God wills the good because it is good." According to my point of view, the first concept is the most fundamental: God demands that which is good.

This is the last thing that can be said about the good; it follows that God is indefinable since the good is absolute and cannot be equated with any changeable component of the cosmos. This draws attention to the fact that, from Wittgenstein's point of view, morality and ethics are inextricably linked, and that, theoretically speaking, ethics is the more important of the two. Whereas morality is dependent on the circumstances, ethics is universal. It is only via moral behaviour that one may achieve the ethical ideal, which is the functional relationship between the two. Moreover, the connection is not in a state of equilibrium: morality is derived from the application of ethics in the real world, and ethical evaluations serve as the basis for moral judgements. Does this result in an image that is more unified? If this is not the case, then we need to investigate the asymmetry and directionality of the interaction between ethics and morality. On the other hand, before we get into that subject, let us first identify a few elements that this approach seems to address.

One of the most significant problems is that there is no acceptable explanation. The following is what Wittgenstein refers to as a "design characteristic": When it comes to ethics, no logical foundation for an empirical theory can exist since ethics must be ineffable. This is because ethics cannot be defined. This is primarily addressed by the idea of absolute ethics, which takes into account the many possibilities that may arise. In addition to this, there is the fundamental nature of the idea of ethics. According to Wittgenstein, if ethical principles are as absolute as he asserts they are, then we should not characterise

the offender as "insane," "eccentric," or "playing a different game." mainly due to the fact that acquittal might be granted in any one of these three instances. Regrettably, there are some clearly defined circumstances in which we will accept a plea of insanity or an appeal to moral relativism (although, "But I am eccentric" would never fly...), but in general, we do hold rulebreakers responsible for their actions. However, absoluteness raises a great deal of problems that need to be answered. A single investigation is being conducted to investigate the underlying nature of ethics. Do I immediately lose my membership in a community if I oppose a moral concept that is generally accepted by the majority of people? Is it possible for a society to be characterised not only by its rules of rule-following but also by its norms of going against the rules?

It is the position's internal stability that is the primary source of the core issue, which is caused by the intrinsic imbalance that exists between morality and ethics. In order to avoid sliding into dogmatism or scepticism, the challenge that arises is how to account for the fact that morality is dependent on the environment in which it is applied while yet maintaining the absolute nature of ethics. It is possible for a person to feel obligated to follow to a rule in an unwavering manner, even if they are aware that everyone is unique. This is the situation in which the rule fulfils its function as an absolute norm, despite the fact that it is not really one. It is thus necessary for an individual to be able to defend the applicability of the rule to themselves in addition to how they feel it applies to other individuals. In spite of the fact that the psychological pressure is indisputable, the logical tension does not exist.<sup>8</sup> When this occurs, the question of the relevance of other individuals comes up. Absolutism is marked by a unilateral and internally orientated "unconditional commitment," in which compassion for other people does not play a systematic role. This characteristics may be observed in the views of Wittgenstein and many other individuals throughout the world. It seems to be in direct opposition to the nature of the real problems.<sup>9</sup>) In addition, it does not address the issue of the need of moral education or the topic of the origin of ethics in any way. It is necessary to provide an explanation of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic stages of ethical development. When it comes to matters of morality, the community and human nature, which are the sources of both education and growth, are mutually dependent on one another. There are indications that this was also a problem for Wittgenstein, as shown by the fact that his writings include references to it. Conduct a comparison and analysis of the following passages taken from notebooks:

A psychophysical connection exists between my spirit, or spirit, and the world. This connection is genuinely there. You should always bear in mind that your spirit is similar to that of a lion or a snake. The reason for this is that acquaintance with spirit can only come from inside oneself. that which follows: Does this provide a solution to the age-old issue of why people have always believed that every living thing have a soul? If that were the case, then it would also be in line with the behaviour of inanimate things. This is another manner in which the will of the world has the potential to be expressed. This will, on the other hand, is my will on a more fundamental level. In the same way that my thoughts are the world, my will is the will of the world collectively.

Through the transcendental subject, the other and one's own self are inseparable from one another. It goes without saying that this does not even come close to understanding the role that actual other individuals play. Despite the fact that everything seems to be exceedingly Schopenhauerian (and, indirectly, Kantian), there is a huge gap between the knowledge of the topic that Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer have presented. In contrast to the latter, who takes an ontological and epistemological attitude,



Wittgenstein adopts a more conceptual and logical approach to understanding the world. However, according to Wittgenstein's understanding, the ethical subject is transcendental in relation to the world as perceived by the discursive subject, rather than "the world as such." Different perspectives on the same reality are represented by the two worldviews that are provided in the Tractatus. These worldviews are the discursive and the ethical. In the context of ethics, the cosmos is referred to as "a (limited) whole," but speech refers to the world as "everything that is the case" (Tractatus 1; atomistic). From this vantage point, there is no inherent conflict between the distinctness of subjects and their intrinsic oneness, between oneself and others. This is because there is no inherent contradiction between the two. Nevertheless, it seems that Wittgenstein is acknowledging in these passages that interacting with other people is an unavoidable component of the moral arena.

The situation that we are now involved in is described in the following paragraphs. In contrast to absolute ethics, which is concentrated on the individual, morality takes into consideration the surrounding environment and embraces both the individual and other people. It is necessary to steer clear of anything in both of them. When it comes to making moral decisions, ignoring the significance of context might result in a strict code of ethics that does not take into account the specifics of each situation. If we restrict ourselves to evaluating morality in its context alone, it is impossible to defend or even construct a context-transcendent ethics; this leads to value scepticism. As a result, we are unable to develop a context-transcendent ethics. How we see morality and ethics in conjunction with one another is the most significant factor. In the event that we consider one to be the more superior option, it is possible that we will not give the other the attention that it merits. Two opposing hypotheses about the nature of the connection between morality and ethics are presented below, and we will offer our brief evaluations of each of these views. It is not only that we will provide reasons in support of the nonstandard approach, but we will also demonstrate that other works by Wittgenstein add credibility to this stance.

### **Ethics and morality: principles first**

"Ethics engenders morality." To look at things in this manner is the traditional approach. In accordance with this point of view, the application of ethics may be as simple as comparing the requirements of the ethics to the characteristics of the situation. To put it simply, the question "What should I do given this predicament?" is the standard formula for a moral dilemma. The articulation of an ethical principle may take the shape of either a wide statement with parameterised reasoning, such as "One should love one's neighbour in situations of type Y," or an exceedingly general form, such as "One should do love one's neighbour." Both of these forms are appropriate. Regardless of the specifics of the situation, the hypothetical ethical principle in issue does not apply to either my position or myself. The ethical conundrum, on the other hand, calls for the application of the principle in a particular setting via the process of instantiation and particularisation. The typical mental model for it is a logical, conversational process: parameters obtain their suitable values from context, which also discovers occurrences of generic phrases. In addition, context finds instances of generic phrases. Ratiocination (the question "Which principle holds water in this case?") and observation (the question "How is the situation currently?") are the methods that we use to do this. If that is the case, how does it come to be? Within the context of this specific scenario, the conclusion is a direct consequence of the rule-required option.

As a consequence of this, the conventional knowledge on action and decision-making is a good fit for the standard viewpoint. It is obvious to everyone why it is attractive here: As a result of its emphasis on

broad ideas and exacting methods for applying them in particular settings, it makes the promise of objectivity, reason, and universal application. But there are problems to be found. It is essential to keep in mind that people are not flawless and that they do not always use reasoning to explain or justify their actions. This is the first step in the process. However, even when they act in such a way, we should still have the goal of establishing it as a normative behaviour. In these kinds of situations, normative evaluation becomes far more difficult since, if the popular knowledge is right, there have been no ethical considerations that have driven the action. There is also the possibility that a person may decide to "go against the grain." It is important to keep in mind that we are talking about normative necessity, not causal necessity, and that ethical principles are not very persuasive because of this. Second, moral character is not something that is innately present in people; rather, it is something that is acquired via education and training, the bulk of which is delivered by "force" (socialisation), imitation, and authority. It does not matter if the objective of the training is to reach a standard view-satisfying condition or not; what is important is that the steps that lead to that end state be just as normatively infused as the final state itself. Last but not least, morality develops with time. Take, for example, the extension of the application of ethical norms outside the bounds of one's immediate social circle as an indication of how this may develop. Additionally, its content changes throughout time, either by prohibiting actions that were previously seen as ethically acceptable or by granting permission for actions that are now considered to be immoral. We have seen changes of this kind throughout the whole of human thinking on ethical matters.

### **Ethics and morality: practice first**

Practice, rather than ideals, is the source of an alternative viewpoint, which places a focus on particular moral judgements, actions, and choices that are made in context as its basis. In the form of a slogan, "Morality engenders ethics" is another method to approach the concept. There are a great number of reasons that may be offered in support of this method. Formal teaching is the first step that has to be taken, and just like any other kind of education, moral education starts in the here and now, with concrete choices, acts, and evaluations, rather than with general ideas. The alternative viewpoint incorporates the link to real-world application as an essential component of its overall structure. Second, by making practice such a central focus, we guarantee that there will be a connection between people and the communities in which they live. Inevitably, community interaction is included into each and every educational activity. As a result, the perspective that disagrees with the majority clings to a technique that is distinctive of Wittgensteinian thought: in order to determine the nature and importance of anything, one should investigate their own learning processes.

Having said that, the counterargument presents its own unique set of challenges. The issue of bootstrapping is a significant cause for concern: The process of ethics, which is responsible for the generation of morality, is dependent on a number of assumptions; in order for the process to be effective, this explanation has to explain those assumptions specifically. In addition to this, it must be able to surmount the challenge of avoidance of doubt: What are some ways that we might create ethics that are not dependent on the circumstances? If we are unable to provide an explanation for it, then it seems that there is no way to avoid relativism. The last element to take into consideration is individualism. Not only is it essential to have a narrative that avoids falling into the trap of placing all of the blame on the individual, but it is also essential to provide an explanation of the circumstances that drive individuals to

make choices that go beyond their moral upbringing. Before anything can be considered about bootstrapping, there are two key assumptions that need to be satisfied: First, that "moral induction" provides a basis for learning and generalisation; and second, that "moral facts" constitute the substrate upon which "moral induction" operates. Both of these arguments are important. These presumptions are controversial, and it is not at all simple to determine whether or not they have a compelling justification. On the other hand, it would seem that they are necessary for the efficient operation of bootstrapping. I think we need to look into it more thoroughly.

## CONCLUSION

We have shown two possible interpretations of the connection between morality and contextual reliance and ethics and absolute worth. It has been discovered that the explanation element of "ethics engenders morality" is unstable and unsatisfying. That "morality engenders ethics" is the counterargument is a more solid position to take. Although it relies heavily on assumptions, it seems to be exegetically feasible and sufficiently anchored in Wittgenstein's words to provide an explanation. Generally held opinions are in direct conflict with the fundamental assumptions. They are against reductionist naturalism, methodological individualism, and the traditional rationality assumptions used to explain actions. This does not rule out the possibility that comparable occurrences in other fields, such meaning normativity, may need countermeasures to these points of view. The resultant perspective helps to provide a more consistent interpretation of Wittgenstein's work by bringing his views on ethics and morality into harmony with other topics, especially the rule-following issues. From a systemic perspective, it is promising as well, but it clearly need further study.

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